

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1487

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 8684

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PARM, US,UR

SUBJECT: TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS - STOESSEL STATEMENT OF JUNE 23

TTBT/PNE MESSAGE NUMBER TWENTY-SIX

1. FOLLOWING IS STOESSEL STATEMENT AS GIVEN AT JUNE 23

PLENARY MEETING:

BEGIN TEXT:

MR. MINISTER, THE US DELEGATION HAS ASKED ME TO EXPRESS TO YOU AND THEIR SOVIET COLLEAGUES THEIR WARMEST THANKS FOR AN ENJOYABLE, INTERESTING AND USEFUL TRIP LAST WEEK TO CENTRAL ASIA. THEY GAINED MUCH IN KNOWLEDGE AND APPRECIATION OF THAT BEAUTIFUL PART OF YOUR COUNTRY AND TWO OUTSTANDING ENGINEERING ACCOMPLISHMENTS USING PNES. THE DELEGATIONS HAVE RETURNED TO THEIR MAIN TASK REFRESHED AND READY TO MOVE AHEAD.

THE FOUR TECHNICAL GROUPS ESTABLISHED DURING THE WEEK OF JUNE 9 WORKED VERY EFFECTIVELY AND MADE SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTIONS TO PROGRESS IN THE TASK OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

IN MY STATEMENT TODAY I WILL COMMENT ON RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FORMAL VIEWS OF THE US SIDE AND POINTS REPORTED BY THE FOUR TECHNICAL GROUPS ON JUNE 15.

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IN ADDITION, I WILL PRESENT FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION SOME

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE US SIDE AS TO STEPS THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS ON CERTAIN MATTERS.

TECHNICAL GROUP I ADDRESSED INFORMATION EXCHANGES NEEDED TO SUPPORT DETERMINATION OF YIELD THROUGH TELESEISMIC MEASUREMENTS. THIS GROUP WAS ASKED TO EXAMINE INFORMATION NEEDED IN YIELD RANGES NEAR THE LIMITS ON MAXIMUM YIELD FOR INDIVIDUAL CONTAINED EXPLOSIONS PROPOSED BY THE TWO SIDES, THAT IS, NEAR 100 KILOTONS AND NEAR 150 KILOTONS.

THE TECHNICAL GROUP WAS NOT EXPECTED TO DECIDE WHAT THE AGREED YIELD LIMIT SHOULD BE.

TECHNICAL GROUP I WAS ALSO ASKED TO EXAMINE INFORMATION NEEDS FOR TELESEISMIC VERIFICATION OF ANNOUNCED YIELDS SMALLER THAN THE AGREED MAXIMUM YIELD.

THE US SIDE HAS REVIEWED THE REPORT OF GROUP I AND HAS FORMED THE OPINION THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO RESOLVE REMAINING DETAILS IN ONE DAY OR NOT MUCH LONGER.

THEREFORE, WE PREFER TO ASK THAT GROUP I COMPLETE ITS WORK ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE BEFORE THE US SIDE MAKES ANY FURTHER STATEMENT OF VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT; AND WE RECOMMEND THAT GROUP I BE CONVENED TOMORROW MORNING FOR THAT PURPOSE.

WHEN DR. SAFRONOV DISCUSSED FOUR CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUAL AND AGGREGATE YIELDS HE SUGGESTED THAT, FOR THE PURPOSE OF TELESEISMIC VERIFICATION, NO GENERAL DISTINCTION NEED BE MADE BETWEEN CONTAINED AND EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS. WE AGREE WITH THIS; AND IT IS OUR VIEW THAT SUCH AN APPROACH SHOULD BE TAKEN ON ANY AGREEMENT TOPIC FOR WHICH IT IS VALID.

THE REPORT OF GROUP I NOTES THAT TELESEISMIC MEASUREMENTS OF YIELDS OF EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS ARE SOMEWHAT MORE UNCERTAIN THAN TELESEISMIC MEASUREMENTS OF YIELDS OF CONTAINED EXPLOSIONS. THE REPORT OF GROUP II ON CLOSE-IN YIELD MEASUREMENTS INDICATES THAT WORK ON GROUND MOTION TECHNIQUES IS NOT COMPLETED AND THAT WORK HAS NOT BEGUN ON SLIFER TECHNIQUES. WE RECOMMEND THAT GROUP II BE CONVENED TOMORROW MORNING TO CONTINUE EXAMINATION OF THESE SUBJECTS.

BASED ON OUR OWN ANALYSES AND EXPERIMENTAL DATA, IT IS THE VIEW OF THE US SIDE THAT CLOSE-IN YIELD MEASUREMENTS SHOULD BE BASED ON SLIFER TECHNIQUES.

AT THE SAME TIME, WE WISH TO SEE THE TWO SIDES COME TO A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF CLOSE-IN GROUND-MOTION TECHNIQUES AND TO HEAR THE VIEWS OF YOUR SIDE ON THEIR
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POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS.

THE REPORT OF GROUP III INDICATES THAT THE TECHNICAL TASK ASSIGNED TO THAT GROUP HAS BEEN COMPLETED. WE RECOMMEND THAT GROUP III, AS SUCH, BE DISESTABLISHED WITH CONGRATULATIONS AND THAT THE EXPERTS INVOLVED IN GROUP III BE ASKED TO AUGMENT GROUP II.

THE REPORT OF GROUP III NOTES THAT YIELD VERIFICATION FROM CRATER DIMENSIONS WITHIN AN ERROR FACTOR OF ABOUT 1.5 CAN BE

REALIZED IF THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS ARE SATISFIED:

I. MINIMUM SEPARATION BETWEEN ADJACENT EXPLOSIONS GREATER THAN THE DEPTH OF THE DEEPER OF THE PAIR OF EXPLOSIONS;

II. GEOMETRY OF THE ARRAY OF EXPLOSIVES IS SUBSTANTIALLY LINEAR;

III. PROJECT CONDUCTED IN A MEDIUM FOR WHICH ADEQUATE EXPERIMENTAL CRATERING DATA IS AVAILABLE.

WE RECOMMEND THAT AUGMENTED GROUP II BE ASKED TO ADDRESS METHODS OF MORE ACCURATE YIELD VERIFICATION IN THE EXCAVATION CASE.

IN THE COURSE OF ITS WORK, GROUP III ALSO EXAMINED THE RESERVATIONS OF THE SOVIET SIDE CONCERNING THE MINIMUM-DEPTH CRITERION FOR EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS PROPOSED BY THE US SIDE. THEIR REPORT INDICATES THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD PREFER THE MINIMUM DEPTH CRITERION TO BE 30 METERS TIMES YIELD IN KILOTONS TO THE POWER ONE OVER 3.4. THIS WOULD REPRESENT A CHANGE IN THE EXPONENT ON YIELD FROM THE FIGURE ONE-THIRD IN THE US PROPOSAL. THE US SIDE IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THIS AMENDMENT ON AN AD REFERENDUM BASIS.

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IN MAKING THIS TENTATIVE ACCEPTANCE OF YOUR AMENDMENT TO THE MINIMUM DEPTH CRITERION WE TAKE NOTE OF THE POINT I MENTIONED ABOVE THAT AGREEMENT TERMS SHOULD BE CITED WITHOUT DISTINCTION AS TO CONTAINED OR EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS WHENEVER IT IS VALID TO DO SO. SINCE NO PROBLEMS OR CONTRADICTIONS ARE EVIDENT TO US IF THIS DEPTH CRITERION IS MADE A GENERAL ONE, WE SUGGEST THAT THIS CRITERION NOT BE IDENTIFIED WITH EXCAVATION, BUT THAT THIS CRITERION BE CITED AS A CONDITION ON ALL PNES.

THE REPORT OF TECHNICAL GROUP IV INDICATES AGREEMENT ON COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF MELT SAMPLES AS THE BASIC APPROACH TO FISSION-YIELD VERIFICATION. THERE IS, HOWEVER, A DIFFERENCE IN VIEWS ON THE PROCEDURES FOR ANALYSIS.

IT IS THE VIEW OF THE US SIDE THAT THE VERIFYING SIDE SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO TRANSPORT THE MELT SAMPLES TO FACILITIES IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY AND TO RETAIN THEM FOR UNRESTRICTED ANALYSIS. THERE IS A COMMON VIEW BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES ON THE METHOD OF SELECTION OF MELT SAMPLES AND THE PROCEDURES BY WHICH THEY ARE PREPARED FOR ANALYSIS. THE SOVIET EXPERTS IN GROUP IV SUGGESTED PROVISIONS FOR COLLECTING AS MANY AS 10 MELT SAMPLES FROM THE VICINITY OF EACH INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSION. I DO NOT HAVE A COMMENT ON THIS FIGURE TODAY, BUT WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO REPLY SOON. ADDITIONALLY, BOTH SIDES RECOGNIZED THAT THERE ARE OTHER LESS ACCURATE METHODS OF ESTIMATING FISSION YIELD AND THAT SUCH METHODS COULD SERVE AS SUPPLEMENTS TO THE BASIC MELT SAMPLE METHOD. THERE WAS RECOGNITION BY BOTH SIDES THAT CASES COULD ARISE IN WHICH AN EXPLOSION WAS INTENDED TO PRODUCE AN EXCAVATION CRATER AND TO THROW OUT USABLE MELT SAMPLES BUT FAILED TO DO SO.

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THE US POSITION IS THAT DRILLBACK SHOULD BE DONE WHENEVER MELT SAMPLES ARE NOT AVAILABLE ON THE SURFACE FROM A PLANNED EXCAVATION EXPLOSION, REGARDLESS OF THE ACTUAL YIELD OF THE EXPLOSION. THE SOVIET SIDE STATED THAT DRILLBACK SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES ONLY IF THE ACTUAL YIELD WERE GREATER THAN THE AGREED YIELD LIMIT FOR CONTAINED EXPLOSIONS. THE EXPERS IN GROUP IV RECOGNIZED THAT AN APPROPRIATE APPROACH TO POSSIBLE RETARC PROJECTS NEEDS TO BE CLARIFIED. SUCH PROJECTS WOULD NOT BE DESIGNED TO MAKE MELT SAMPLES AVAILABLE FOR COLLECTION ON THE SURFACE; AND IT SEEMS TO US THAT THEY SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS AGREED UPON FOR CONTAINED EXPLOSIONS. THE EXPERTS IN GROUP IV IDENTIFIED, BUT DID NOT EXAMINE, AN IMPORTANT POINT WHICH AROSE LATE IN ROUND II. I REFER TO THE US VIEW THAT INFORMATION SHOULD BE EXCHANGED ON THE DEPTH, GEOMETRY, DIMENSIONS AND OTHER FEATURES OF THE EMPLACEMENT HOLE, AND THAT SUCH INFORMATION SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION. IT IS NOW UNDERSTOOD BY BOTH SIDES THAT A FISSION YIELD LIMIT WOULD APPLY TO THE FISSION YIELD ACTUALLY PRODUCED BY AN EXPLOSION USED FOR EXCAVATION, AND THAT THE DETERMINATION OF FISSION YIELD WOULD BE FOR THE PRUPOSE OF VERIFYING THE ACTUAL FISSION YIELD PRODUCED BY THE EXPLOSIVE. RELATED TO THIS MATTER IS THE STATEMENT BY SOVIET EXPERTS IN GROUP IV THAT EXPLOSIVE EMPLACEMENTS WOULD BE DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF EJECTED RADIOACTIVITY, BUT THAT THIS WOULD NOT AFFECT THE DETERMINATION OF FISSION YIELD. WE BELIEVE THAT INFORMATION ON THE DEPTH, GEOMETRY, ETC., OF THE EXPLOSIVE EMPLACEMENT SHOULD BE EXCHANGED. THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND ITS INDEPENDENT CONFIRMATION BY OBSERVATION, WOULD ENABLE THE VERIFYING SIDE TO FORM ITS OWN JUDGEMENT WHETHER THE DETERMINATION OF FISSION YIELD BY THE

ANALYSIS OF MELT SAMPLES COLLECTED FROM THE SURFACE WILL PROVIDE AN ESTIMATE OF THE ACTUAL FISSION YIELD OF THE DEVICE.

WE RECOMMEND THAT GROUP IV BE CONVENED TOMORROW AFTERNOON TO CONTINUE TECHNICAL EXAMINATIONS OF THE INCOMPLETE POINTS WHICH I HAVE JUST MENTIONED.

THERE IS ANOTHER TASK WHICH WE SHOULD PLAN TO UNDERTAKE IN A FEW DAYS. THAT IS THE TASK OF DRAWING UP A COMPLETE LIST OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE POINTS. THE WORK OF GROUP I HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO INFORMATION NEEDED FOR TELESEISMIC YIELD VERIFICATION. THERE ARE OTHER IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE WHICH WILL NEED TO BE INCORPORATED IN A COMPLETE LIST.

MR. MINISTER, THIS HAS BEEN A RATHER LONG STATEMENT.

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HOWEVER, WE WISH TO IDENTIFY AND COMPLETE EVERY ELEMENT OF OUR TASK AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, AND TO PROMPTLY EXPLOIT ALL OF THE PROGRESS MADE BY THE TECHNICAL WORKING GROUPS TO THAT END.

WE WILL BE INTERESTED IN YOUR VIEWS ON ALL OF THESE MATTERS.

THANK YOU.

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